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A GROUND FORCE CONCEPT FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

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Bachelor of Arts
Purdue University, 1978

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
in the International Studies Program of the
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A Ground Force Concept for Low Intensity Conflict

I. Introduction

The current international arena can be viewed as one of continuous change toward more interdependent relationships among the nation-states that make up the system. This interdependence is slowly taking the form of the ideal type postulated by Nye and Keohane in their 1977 work Power and Interdependence.¹ Although traditional interstate rivalries still exist, we are currently observing a continual evolution away from the bankrupt communist political policies of the 1950's and 60's toward those more characteristic of interstate regime building by both governmental and nongovernmental actors.² We are observing daily the slow democratization of Poland and Hungary combined with popular uprisings in other Eastern European states for similar political reforms. The Iron Curtain of the past forty years is no longer a barrier to emigration from the east to the west. Arms control agreements between

¹Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1977), 23-29.

²Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3d ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 15-29.

the U.S. and the USSR and between NATO and the USSR have been created in both the nuclear and conventional arenas in an attempt to circumvent crises and the escalation to global nuclear warfare. Our enemies of forty years ago have become our allies of the present as we have become economically and militarily intertwined in security and monetary agreements which, if abandoned, would possibly destroy the current international order.³ Much of this can possibly be attributed to a growing acceptance of democratic institutions combined with the apparent failure of Communism as an economic and political system.

On the other hand, one must also take into account the changes occurring in the third world. A large portion of the third world looks to the north as both a role model and as a market. Unfortunately, parts of the third world have also become a battleground for competing ideologies. Groups within these states are politically and militarily active in an attempt to overthrow the current regime within the state. Normally, this is accomplished by adhering to one of the prevailing world ideologies and requesting support for the cause with an eye toward independence and support from a northern industrialized state. Both the U.S. and the USSR often offer support to protect their interests abroad and to

³Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1988), 311-314.

enhance their external security within the nation-state system. This ongoing ideological fight in the Third World is then manifested as either political or armed conflict which may act as a destabilizing factor on the interstate system as a whole and would necessarily become of great concern to the sponsoring superpowers. Therefore, it is very important to be able to identify the nature of these conflicts and develop appropriate doctrine designed to successfully resolve these conflicts should indirect support or intervention be indicated to maintain the stability of the system.

By taking this large view of the international relations world, one may see indications of trends away from the probability of war between the great northern industrialized powers and indications of trends toward interstate conflict among the third world based on the support of either the U.S. or the USSR.⁴ If these trends are indeed true, how should the U.S. respond to these trends in the development and maintenance of its armed forces and, more specifically, the United States Army?

A. Overview

This paper, in an attempt to answer the above question, will develop an overview of the changing nature of war and

⁴Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3d ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 399-401.

will look at the trends in interstate warfare. From this standpoint, an argument will be developed as to the probability of world war encompassing the nation-state system in the near future. Further, trends in modern warfare will be pointed to as indicative of the future of armed conflict. This effort will then lead to a discussion of the types of conflict which are likely to prevail in the 1990's and into the next century. As the nature of warfare changes, so does the method in which that conflict is fought. In dealing with this method, this paper will take an in-depth look at the current warfighting concept of the U.S. Army, the importance of this concept to U.S. security interests, and the deficiencies as they exist within the current concept. Finally, this paper will explore how the current concept can be modified to enable the historically inflexible structure of the Army to take on an expanded role in preparation for the diverse threats it now faces.

Although the terminology seems reminiscent of the Flexible Response Policy of the Kennedy Administration, it is intended to convey a much broader appreciation of the problems facing the decision makers of the U.S. Army now and in the future. In fact, one might characterize the application of this enhanced appreciation as a policy of "Flexible Support". Where Flexible Response was grounded in a conventional response to conventional conflicts, "Flexible Support" will focus on the development of unconventional

response to unconventional conflicts.

B. Literature Review

As mentioned earlier, the continually interacting international world seems to be a more interdependent world without strict adherence to the traditional precepts of realism as an international relations theory. In addition to Nye and Keohane as early interdependent thinkers, one can look to Stephen Krasner who has developed the most commonly used definition of regimes and their impact on today's international society.

"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."⁵

The establishment and acceptance of regimes in all facets of international relations has enabled the concerned states to interact at multiple levels and come to reasonable agreements about the management of the system with less resort to conflict to accomplish the needs of the state. However, one must realize that the adoption of an interdependent view of world politics does not necessarily negate a realistic view of interstate action as described by

⁵Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequence," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 186.

Morgenthau⁶ and Kennan⁷ as a logical extension of the writings of Machiavelli,⁸ it only requires modification into a neo-realist position which appreciates the significance of interstate interaction at levels both above and below that of the state. An understanding of these and other works are important to act as a theoretically organizing perspective from which to best develop policy guidance which will better serve today's world. It also helps to develop a view which is above that of the interstate actor and which encompasses vignettes from international interaction throughout the world. In this manner, certain trends have become apparent in the nature of interstate warfare. These trends indicate that wars are more destructive than in the past and are largely confined to conventional warfare between small states.⁹ This position is supported by numerous authors, some of which will be reviewed below.

⁶Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Knopf, 1973).

⁷George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947).

⁸Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London, England: Penguin Books, 1981).

⁹Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3d ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 392-393.

Similarly, Charles F. Hermann indicates this and suggests a U.S. insensitivity to new threats due to our thirty year obsession with the cold war.¹⁰ Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh state in the introductory chapter of their book, Low Intensity Warfare, that the conflict of the eighties and nineties will be of the low-intensity type.¹¹ Finally, Jack S. Levy explores the conflict phenomena from an long term empirical perspective and develops similar conclusions in his article Historical Trends in Great Power War, 1495-1975.¹² These and many other authors seem to indicate that a basic transformation in the nature of conflict in the contemporary international world is taking place. Further, trends would indicate that the most war prone area of the world prior to 1945 (Central Europe) has demonstrated a steady decline in interstate conflict in the post war years. Obviously a dramatic change has occurred in the past forty years, but what of the rest of the world?

¹⁰Charles F. Hermann, "Defining National Security," in American Defense Policy, 5th ed., Ed(s) John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 20.

¹¹Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, "The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 7-9.

¹²Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," International Studies Quarterly 30 (June 1986), 298.

As stated in the first paragraph, the northern industrialized states (more commonly referred to as the Great Powers) are slowly evolving into a more highly complex interdependent system where the influence of International Governmental Organizations (IGO's), International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO's), and Multinational Corporations (MNC's) have great influence in the changing nature of world society and the policy of the states which affect that change.¹³ It seems that this influence has positively affected conflict management within the Great Powers. On the other hand, the third world, as earlier characterized, lacks the influence of the northern states and the resulting frustration culminates in adherence to new and radically different views of world society. Theories of development and underdevelopment prevail in attempting to explain this growing phenomenon. Ronald H. Chilcote has outlined these authors in his work Theories of Development and Underdevelopment and has given a concise overview of the myriad of competing theories within this concept.¹⁴ Although the works are many, all seem to take on the basic structure as expressed by Immanuel Wallerstein of

¹³Robert Gilpin, "Multinational Corporations and International Production," Chap. 6 in The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 231-262.

¹⁴Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Development and Under-development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

a core, semi-periphery, and periphery.¹⁵ However bankrupt and degenerating these theories seem to be, they hold particular importance for the policymakers of the affected third world states and one must take them into account when developing policy guidance for force structures which have to successfully deal with actors and elites operating from differing orienting strategies.

Development theory came into vogue as a logical defense to the continual real problems with the predictive power of Marxism. Therefore, one must also take into account the Communist perspective as it is manifest in today's Soviet and Chinese societies. This perspective helps the current conflict theorist in explaining and better predicting the overt internal and external military behavior of these two nuclear powers. Their combined influence affects much of the hostile third world and, in some cases, acts against the security interests of the United States. Although these perspectives are in a state of change and fluctuation, the basic tenets of the theories are as set forth by Marx, Lenin, and Mao tse-Tung. Anthony Brewer sufficiently handles the origins of Marxism and Leninism and their evolution into these theories of today in his book Marxist

¹⁵Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 165-167.

Theories of Imperialism.¹⁶ All the above influential authors and the authors they discuss give us a significant overview of primarily four competing theories of international relations; realism, complex interdependence, Marxism, and development theory, all of which may impact on the function of the world political and economic orders as they are manifest in the minds of the policy-makers which adhere to them. One must gain a sufficient understanding of these works in order to develop a "Flexible Support Doctrinology" within the U.S. Army which will better serve the interests of the United States and help to ensure peace in the immediate future. Simply stated, one must appreciate the perspective of a potential opponent in order to predict his actions which may affect your current position.

More specifically though, one has to also get a feel for the works which impact on conflict analysis within today's world. Probably the most influential writer concerning the political uses of war was Carl von Clausewitz. In his work, On War, Clausewitz first describes war as a rational instrument of national policy and advocates the pursuit of judicious war in the implementation of policy. Clausewitz described war as "... an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our

¹⁶Ibid.

will."¹⁷ This definition is very similar to the definition of power as proposed by international realists in the postwar era and one can easily see the impact of Clausewitz throughout the recent history of conflict.

In his application of Clausewitz's principles, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. points to a overall failure by the U.S. Army in their employment to achieve U.S. national objectives in Vietnam. His book, On Strategy, alludes to a seeming inflexibility in the U.S. defense structure to change in accordance with changing U.S. national policy and also states that doctrine and tactics must necessarily flow from this combination of policy and strategy.¹⁸ However, Summers attempts to adapt the U.S. training doctrine to the situation in Vietnam to accomplish the goal of achieving U.S. national policy. Conversely, The Army and Vietnam written by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., points to the U.S. Army's strict adherence to the "Army's Concept" as the primary cause for the failure of the United States military and political goals in Vietnam.¹⁹ However, Krepinevich only

¹⁷Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London, England: Penguin Books, 1988), 101.

¹⁸Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), 24-25.

¹⁹Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 4.

offers a solution to what he perceives as the future of U.S. Army conflict; counterinsurgency. He does not address the other threats which may significantly impact on the trainers of the Army of the future. However, Krepinevich does present a very incisive and compelling argument which should not be discarded because of the limitations of the cure.

In a similar vein, Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh describe a discipline-wide realization, both within the community of scholars and the defense department, that low intensity conflict is the most likely form of conflict that U.S. soldiers will be exposed to in the near future.²⁰ They go on to adopt the three distinct terms used by the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report in defining types of conflict:

"Guerrilla wars and other limited conflicts fought with irregular units are labelled "low-intensity conflict"...; regional wars fought with modern weapons (such as the Iran-Iraq conflict) are considered "mid-intensity conflicts"; and a global nonnuclear conflagration (like World Wars I and II) or a nuclear engagement fall into the "high-intensity" category."²¹

These definitions, which are supported by the U.S. Army in its publication Low Intensity Conflict, are presented as

²⁰Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, "The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 4-6.

²¹United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report," Executive Summary, Washington, DC, 1985, 3.

central to the understanding of low-intensity warfare and the threats that this type of conflict present.²²

As can be seen, the state of the discipline concerning the future of U.S. conflict can be generalized by stating that most defense studies authors would agree that the probability of war among the Great Powers is at its lowest since the immediate post-World War II era. Further, current conflict trends indicate that future U.S. conflict will generally take the form of unconventional or low- to mid-intensity warfare. Finally, this paper holds that current U.S. Army training doctrine is geared toward fighting another world war of the high intensity type. If this is the case, then the next question that must be addressed is what is the state of military preparedness in response to this threat? It is the position of this paper that the U.S. Army is marginally prepared for the warfare it will face in the future. Further, it seems that an obvious gap exists in the defense studies literature addressing this problem as well as prescribing effective strategies for increasing the preparedness of the U.S. Army to face the myriad of threats which currently exist. In developing a proposal to fill this gap, this paper will discuss numerous authors which have critically dealt with the phenomena of

²²United States Department of the Army, "Low Intensity Conflict," FM 100-20, Washington, DC, 16 January 1981, 14.

high-intensity conflict as well as those which have explored containment, proxy war, insurgency, terrorism, and drug interdiction. This in-depth exploration of conflict phenomenon will serve as an overview of the types of threats which the U.S. Army must be prepared to meet in the 1990's and beyond.

II. The Changing Nature of War

A. Introduction

A review of conflict as it has evolved from the time of Clausewitz to the present is of importance due to the influence this change has had on modern military thought. Although nineteenth century Europe demonstrated some unusually long eras of peace,²³ the wars that did affect that continent were characterized by large formations of combatants maneuvering against one another using weaponry that had limited range. Cavalry was typically the shock force of the day and its successful deployment often carried a decisive battle. Technology was such that maneuver to fairly close ranges by the ground forces was necessary to act as an effective element of the battle. As technology increased, the nature of war slowly changed to that of the trench warfare that developed in the late 1800's and the

²³Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3d ed. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1988), 18.

early 1900's.²⁴ The weapons of mass destruction were such that survival depended on the security of the trench combined with massive rushes to achieve little or no territory. This trend was abruptly cast aside with the advent of blitzkrieg and the massive use of wheeled and tracked vehicles to achieve significant territorial gains in a relatively short period of time. World War II was significant in that it was the last great war where high-intensity conventional techniques were successfully utilized by the U.S. Army. Since that time, the nature of war has changed from that of an orderly, regulated, and predictable phenomena to one where unconventional techniques, personnel, and weaponry prevail. Unfortunately, many armies have had the misfortune of preparing for the last war and not the next. Has this occurred in the United States since 1945? The marginal success of Korea and the debacle of Vietnam would seem to indicate as much. If so, then we may be on a track of continued failure in the application of force in support of U.S. policy. This will be explored further in the next section.

B. Current Threats to U.S. National Security

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger has defined U.S. national security objectives as:

- "1. To prevent the coercion of the United States, its allies, and friends. 2. To be

²⁴Ibid, 210-220.

capable of protecting U.S. interests and U.S. citizens abroad. 3. To maintain access to critical resources around the globe, including petroleum. 4. To oppose the global expansion of Soviet political control and military presence, particularly where such presence threatens the American geostrategic position. 5. To encourage long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire that will facilitate building a more peaceful and secure world order."²⁵

All of these objectives are valid and real concerns which encompass the myriad of threat types that can negatively affect the successful implementation of U.S. foreign policy and may, in fact, threaten Americans both abroad and at home. Accordingly, as is developed by both Clausewitz and Summers, the U.S. Army must be prepared to fight these threats as they manifest themselves anywhere in the world.

Prevention of the coercion of the U.S. and its allies is most commonly assigned to U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrence forces. It also entails a valid response to a conventional warfighting scenario in Europe and the Middle East. The protection of U.S. interests and citizens encompasses the maintenance of effective responses to Marxist or Communist aggression in areas of U.S. interest in the third world while dictating necessary responses to threats from unconventional avenues such as terrorism and illegal drug trafficking. The maintenance of access to worldwide critical resources requires both the continued

²⁵Frank R. Barnett, Richard H. Shultz and B. Hugh Tovar, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 36-37.

successful implementation of a policy of containment combined with an ability to respond rapidly to developing situations in the Middle East and other critical areas of the globe. A policy of containment is most closely related to the opposition of Soviet global expansion combined with the encouragement of military and political changes within the Soviet Union, however, the preparation for the combination of threats which currently assail the U.S. will also go far in serving as an example of the most successful means to accomplish the business of peace throughout the world and should act as a positive reinforcement to the Soviet Union to follow our lead.

If one views our national security objectives from the above perspective, then one must recognize that conventional threats are not the only threats the U.S. defense establishment must be prepared to fight. Further, the increasing frequency of unconventional war within the Third World requires that the U.S. be prepared to fight unconventional threats on more than one front utilizing assets not specifically designed to accomplish the unconventional mission. If one accepts these assertions, then the logic of a multi-trained, responsive military becomes readily apparent. Particularly in an age when defense dollars can not be allocated in support of specialized troops for every contingency. But before a discussion of the style of force is developed, an overview

of the types of threats which the Army will encounter in the next decade and beyond is necessary to better develop the force in response to those threats.

1. Nuclear War

Nuclear conflict is the most commonly referred to and most widely known concern among the population of the United States today. However, in probabilistic terms, it is the least likely of all conflicts to occur in today's world. However, this threat is realistic and must be prepared for in terms of deterrence and response to future nuclear war. The Harvard Nuclear Study Group has examined the differing scenarios where nuclear war is likely and concludes that, in the most likely scenario, nuclear war is most probable as an escalation from conventional, high-intensity warfare. Therefore, the most effective prevention of nuclear war is the prevention of conventional war.²⁶ This is primarily a task of the U.S. Army in its forward deployed positions of Western Europe and on the Korean peninsula. In maintaining these positions, we have taken a stand against any form of aggression which may affect the continued democracy and stability of U.S. allies in historically contested areas of the world. Any aggression on allied nations would be perceived as an attack on the U.S. herself and, accordingly,

²⁶Albert Carnesale et al., "How Might A Nuclear War Begin," in The Nuclear Reader, 2d ed., Ed(s) Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 268-269.

would bring the might of the U.S. into the fray. Further, our tactical and strategic nuclear forces act as an umbrella to those same allies in response to the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. This combination of a nuclear and conventional deterrence in Europe and the Orient serves to prevent conventional war, and consequently, global or regional nuclear war. This deterrence doesn't preclude a surprise pre-emptive attack on the strategic capabilities of the U.S.; however, the continued maintenance of these forces does ensure that a "bolt from the blue" first strike is highly unlikely due to the Soviet doubt concerning a U.S. second strike capability. What should be taken away from this discussion is the decreasing probability of a nuclear war in the near future. Consequently, we must turn to the other dangers that may negatively effect the security of the United States.

2. Central Front War

The strategic thinkers idea of a Central Front War usually envisions a breakdown in NATO and Soviet relations, the mobilization of troops along the east-west European frontiers, and a rapid breakout of Soviet Forces into West Germany. Allied tactics at this point would be to fight a retrograde, defensive style battle with the emphasis on delay until full mobilization and deployment from the U.S. can be accomplished. Typically, delay of this sort includes the use by both sides of tactical nuclear weapons which is

almost universally viewed as the beginning of an escalation to the use of strategic nuclear weapons as was discussed in the preceding paragraph.²⁷ The costly nature of a conflict of this type and the damage and loss projected for both sides is the primary military deterrent of Soviet aggression in Europe. Further, this escalation of first conventional and then strategic military force would most likely occur in any area of U.S. vital interest upon evidence of Soviet overt aggression. This would indicate that a Central Front style war between U.S., Allied, and Soviet forces is unlikely in Europe. Therefore, if both a European Central Front and Global Nuclear Wars are unlikely in this day and age, what is the nature of the conflicts that will commonly arise to challenge, in general, U.S. national security interests, and, more specifically the U.S. Army.

3. Containment Activity

In the post World War II era the United States, in recognizing the aggressive nature of Soviet philosophy, has been committed to a partially mobilized, interventionist style strategy with the emphasis on the containment of Soviet influence and expansionism in both hemispheres of the world. This can readily be seen by U.S. actions beginning

²⁷Ibid, 261-263.

with the Berlin Crisis of 1948,²⁸ continuing through intervention in Greece, Korea,²⁹ Cuba, The Congo, Southeast Asia,³⁰ Afghanistan, Central America,³¹ and Grenada. Further, U.S. forward deployed soldiers maintain an effective buffer and conventional deterrent in Europe, South Korea, and Japan not to mention the large amounts of military and domestic aid given to numerous countries throughout the world intended to support that country against destabilizing activities. Any overt act of aggression in these areas could be perceived as an attack on the vital interests of the United States, possibly leading to a confrontation between the superpowers. All these measures act to "contain" the Soviet threat within established borders. The idea has worked and it has worked to such a degree that the early Reagan Administration developed a policy of "roll back" or proinsurgency to

²⁸D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin, Airbridge To Berlin (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), Chap 1.

²⁹Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York, NY: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), 58-69.

³⁰Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History A Companion to the PBS Television Series (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1983), 247-254.

³¹Leslie Cockburn, Out Of Control (New York, NY: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 5-8.

augment worldwide U.S. containment activity.³² Further, it seems that this aggressive approach to containment activity combined with a hard line approach toward the USSR during the period 1979-1984 has reestablished U.S. credibility and pre-eminence in international relations.³³ Therefore, one must assume that containment activity will continue in the future for U.S. military advisors and possibly U.S. conventional forces in an era where U.S. security interests are being threatened as close to home as Nicaragua and El Salvador.

4. Proxy War

Some war theorists have proposed that the nuclear equation has only inhibited the advent of great power war and has done little to stop the resort to arms in a conventional sense. Therefore, the leaders of the competing powers have developed a less risky option of political strategies by shifting it to the Third World in the form of small, regional conflicts fought by the Third World "proxies" of the great powers. Simply, the use of Third World proxy soldiers to accomplish political change in the

³²Peter Kornbluh, "Nicaragua: U.S. Proinsurgency Warfare Against the Sandinistas," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 136.

³³Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3d ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 80-86.

vital areas of the world. These proxies, due to lack of training, equipment, or manpower, or due to the need for plausible deniability by the supporting government, usually take on guerilla or insurgent tactics to accomplish the necessary change. These tactics are commonly characterized by the use of ambush, hit and run, and terrorist style bombings to undermine public confidence in the government and negatively impact on the morale of the military. An important feature of proxy war is the support of the intervening great power with military aid in the form of both arms and/or advisors. A recent example of a proxy war would be the U.S., Soviet, and Cuban support of the adversaries in Angola as well as the current U.S. and Soviet support of the conflict in Afghanistan.³⁴ The apparent point to the support of proxies is the reduction or negation of the chances that great power forces may come into actual contact, and thereby preventing escalation to a confrontation of global proportions. Although, the very nature of proxy war seems to preclude the use of U.S. combatants, it does not preclude the extensive use of military advisors and support personnel. Therefore, proxy war is another threat which the U.S. Army must continue to be prepared for in the future.

³⁴Selig S. Harrison, "Afghanistan: Soviet Intervention, Afghan Resistance, and the American Role," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 182-185.

5. Insurgency

If we can rule out the likelihood of a conventional style Central Front War among superpowers, then what is the style of conflict of the future? It is certain that both superpowers will attempt to maintain parity of influence in world affairs, develop markets for consumption of manufactured goods abroad, search out new deposits of natural resources to feed developing technologies, and continue to maintain a forward deployed presence to maintain the security of both sovereign territories. This competition may lead to future political and military conflict. But, as stated earlier, conflict will probably not be of a conventional sort. As with the combatants in a proxy war, insurgency seems to be the most prevalent form of conflict within the world today. Although "civil war" is tossed around concerning action within various states, the tactics employed are most often indicative of the insurgent in the Maoist tradition.

Insurgency can only be locally supported in one of two ways; either through popular support of the insurgent movement or through coercion of the population by the insurgent fighters typically of the style of Mao tse-Tung in China and Ho Chi Minh and General Vo- Nguyen Giap in

Vietnam.³⁵ Insurgency tactics are designed to increase the instability of a government to the point where popular support has changed in favor of the insurgent, external support systems are brought into question, or further, are actively demonstrated against, and where a revolutionary force, fighting along the lines of conventional war can be brought into action to overthrow the government. This concept is best defined by Major Krepinevich when he states:

"Contemporary insurgency is a Third World phenomenon comprising three phases: first, insurgent agitation and proselytization among the masses--the phase of contention; second, overt violence, guerilla operations, and the establishment of bases--the equilibrium phase; and third, open warfare between insurgent and government forces designed to topple the existing regime--the counteroffensive phase."³⁶

Warfare of this nature is not of the conventional or "Army Concept" style, yet strategists and tacticians of today are fairly unanimous in their belief that insurgency is the warfare the U.S. will be confronted within the foreseeable future.³⁷ In fact, former President Reagan directed the U.S. Special Forces to increase emphasis on insurgency

³⁵Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History A Companion to the PBS Television Series (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1983), 181-188.

³⁶Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7.

³⁷Ibid, 274.

tactics to support contingencies in Central America.³⁸ This indicates an administration recognition of the viability of insurgency operations to support vital interests. If insurgency is the battle of the future, what can be done now to prepare for the defeat of insurgent forces in any area of the world?

Counterinsurgency is the obvious answer. But first one must analyze the nature of insurgency to develop doctrine to fight it. The insurgent, while in the contention or equilibrium phase, is not concerned with engaging government or allied forces in a decisive battle. The insurgent is most capable when he cannot be located and engaged. He must be able to move freely through little controlled or uncontrolled areas where his style of warfare can do the most damage to meet his objectives. This activity is primarily within government or allied areas of control but where minimum manpower is emplaced due to the application of the conventional forces of the state. Further, the government or allied response is to lay these control measures over the battlefield and go off hunting for the insurgents in a massive formation. Intelligence assets are dedicated to looking for the insurgent near perceived fronts in enclaves that allow them to move into friendly areas at

³⁸Stephen D. Goose, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Warriors and Their Weapons," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 83.

will to do their damage. The entire thrust of the army is to engage and destroy an enemy that is usually not there. In other words, valuable resources are spent chasing ghosts. What must be taken from this discussion is that the insurgent is maintaining his base within the friendly lines, he does not mass in formations until the latter stages of the insurgency, and he is probably receiving his support by coercing the local population through threats or intimidation. To fight this problem, the professional soldier must overlook preconceived notions concerning conventional warfare and dedicate assets to winning the insurgent war within his own lines.

Counterinsurgency must begin with the support base of the insurgent. Based on the assumption that the sympathies of the population lie with the controlling regime, or are at worst, ambivalent, the effective counterinsurgent must move into the villages and farm communities outside of his own support base. These collectives generally provide the insurgent with the much needed perishable resources to enable him to continue the fight. Often these areas also serve as daylight havens and storage for arms, ammunition, and explosives. U.S. Forces, in the later stages of the Vietnam War, would typically destroy these villages upon their discovery, and unknowingly drive the population

further into the insurgent camp.³⁹ Conversely, the counterinsurgent must effectively win the hearts and minds of the local population to isolate and weaken the insurgent. This is accomplished by teaching the locals to defend themselves from coercion and supplying the necessary weaponry and equipment to accomplish this defense while maintaining the twenty-four hour security of the majority of the villages and communities throughout the rear area. Medical and humanitarian support must also be supplied to round out the support package and to convince the local population that the support is not merely a pragmatic gesture. This is an expensive task further exacerbated by the insurgent movements within the major cities.

Third World cities represent another major insurgent feeding ground where the contention phase can easily be applied due to typically poor living conditions and the multitude of slum areas that can be used as havens by the insurgent. Again the counterinsurgency has to leave the safety of the perimeter and assist the local slum dweller or poverty wage earner with employment, financial, medical, and security support on a round the clock basis until the government can alleviate the conditions and security can be maintained by the local police or militia. As stated

³⁹Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 198-200.

earlier, a very expensive task, but the counterinsurgency war can not be won on the cheap or through firepower alone.⁴⁰

Insurgency seems to make up the large part of the future conflict of U.S. ground forces, however, two other concerns have recently become popularized within the United States as well as by the policy makers within the government. Terrorism and drug interdiction have recently become viewed as threats to the national security of the United States and, as such, must be addressed by the military establishment.

6. Terrorism

Brian M. Jenkins defines terrorism as "...violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm - in a word, to terrorize - and thereby bring about some social or political change."⁴¹ Terrorism is generally characterized as using criminal or felonious methods to achieve political goals by affecting the viewing audience of the crime. Terrorism is not directed at the victims of the crime. The supposition is simply that a political "cause" can be popularized by drawing media attention to a criminal act which is linked to ideological

⁴⁰Ibid, 232-233.

⁴¹Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: The Other World War," Rand Monograph, Project Air Force, Santa Monica, CA, November 1985, 2-4.

goals and doesn't simply serve to enhance the financial or legal position of the perpetrator. Due to the terrorist's preference to criminal methods and to a worldwide reluctance to recognize terrorists as legitimate "soldiers" fighting a just "war", most industrialized nations have relegated terrorist violence to the responsibility of the various affected law enforcement jurisdictions. On the other hand, Jeffrey D. Simon states that certain terrorist events can be perceived as a threat to national security and a U.S. military response is justified in ensuring that cumulative attacks do not go unanswered over time.⁴² However, this strategy in the U.S. is not accomplishing the mission of protecting United States citizens abroad. Even with FBI and CIA assistance, foreign police agencies have been unable to stop terrorism in the form of terrorist kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations.

Although the options are limited for the deployment of U.S. defense assets in the fight against terrorism abroad, the Defense Department can mobilize its impressive intelligence gathering forces in an attempt to thwart individual incidents of terrorist activity before they happen. Further, when terrorist cells are identified, U.S. defense assets can be used to destroy those cells in similar fashion to the raid on Libya in 1986, even if this requires

⁴²Jeffrey D. Simon, "Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat," Rand Monograph, Santa Monica, CA, June 1987, 16-17.

the use of the Delta Force in a pre-emptive foreign ground strike. Terrorism is a growing phenomenon within the world which will continue to have negative effects on U.S. citizens and interests abroad and, possibly, at home. Due to the highly decentralized nature and the limited budgetary base of the law enforcement community of the United States, the U.S. Army must be prepared to take on this challenge as directed by the present or future administrations.

7. Drug Interdiction

Another threat which has traditionally been the responsibility of the various law enforcement agencies of the United States is the threat of drugs to the youth and the middle aged of America. Although the drug phenomena is not new, its current form has serious implications for the security of the United States. Drug use, as fueled by the liberal attitudes of the 1960's, is no longer limited to the counterculture or the criminal element. Drug use was pervasive on the college campuses of the 1970's and has become of serious concern among the world athletic councils of the 1980's. Further, the advent of new, cheaper, highly addictive, and quickly manufactured drugs such as Crack has created a situation where the youth of America are being exposed to the culture of drugs at an increasingly younger age. A growing public perception to this danger has fueled a similar concern among the policy makers of America. The U.S. is currently attempting to come to grips with the

threat of drugs and has only just started a unified response to the drug situation. It would seem that any phenomena which threatens both the moral fiber and the very lives of the citizens of the United States must be perceived as a threat to the very existence of the U.S. and a unified response from military, judiciary, and law enforcement arms of the national government is entirely justified. Although the military has been historically reluctant to take on the drug problem, recent statements by Richard Cheney, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, have indicated that a U.S. military response is at least being conceptualized. In agreement with the current administration, this paper views drug trafficking in the U.S. as a serious threat to U.S. security and strongly advocates the use of the U.S. military community to enhance drug interdiction efforts by the federal and local law enforcement agencies. However, support of this nature must proceed without degradation of the warfighting mission of the services involved and must necessarily fit into the total training package of the military.

III. The Current U.S. Army Warfighting Concept

The "Army Concept" of earlier reference is defined by Major Krepinevich as:

"The Army Concept of war is, basically, the Army's perception of how wars ought to be waged and is reflected in the way the Army organizes and

trains its troops for battle. The characteristics of the Army Concept are two: a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties..." 43

The U.S. Army has designed a combat organization which builds on itself as the most efficient and effective means to apply the Army "Concept". Robert E. Osgood further clarifies this concept in his article Limited War and Power Projection when he states:

"The actual conduct of war is conditioned by the ingrained doctrine, training, and organization of the U.S. military establishment, particularly the U.S. Army, to fight wars by overpowering the adversary's manpower and logistics with massive striking force and attrition - a disposition born of superior resources and technology - although wars of maneuver and mobility may be more effective both militarily and politically."44

More specifically, this "Concept" is simply the visualization of war as it would be fought on the European Central Front against a Soviet or Soviet style enemy utilizing heavy mechanized and armor forces. The total incorporation of the "Airland Battle" with all the established doctrine of the all the branches attached. In the various scenarios, the magnitude of this battle is

43Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 5.

44Robert E. Osgood, "Limited War and Power Projection," in American Defense Policy, 5th ed., Ed(s) John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 379.

either lessened or expanded but the basic tactics and doctrine remain the same. This is true no matter the configuration of the force; Armor, Heavy Mechanized, Mechanized Infantry, Infantry, Light Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, or Special Operations. The emphasis remains on the creation of boundaries, a forward line of troops (FLOT), fire zones, control measures, maneuver, and the direction of the defensive or offensive battle to hold positions or attain objectives.⁴⁵ These control measures form, basically, the framework of modern warfare in which any industrialized power must be able to fight and defend against in order to guarantee the survival of its political system and country as it is constituted, either through the use of her own forces or depending on the forces of another country to provide the experience and resources. All this depends on the establishment of a large and fairly inflexible support system in the various rear areas of the maneuver elements. These factors are similar and common among all modern armies. However, the implementation of this concept is an act of last resort, requiring full mobilization and a commitment to the deployment of millions of servicemen at great loss to states involved. This is typically the "Third World War" scenario as postulated by

⁴⁵United States Army Combined Arms Services Staff School, Tactics Overview, E607, 3 vols. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Government Printing House, 1984), vol. 3, 29-30.

General Sir John Hackett in his book The Third World War and may serve as a prelude to escalation to tactical or strategic nuclear war.⁴⁶

Obviously, for survival as well as political and economic reasons, any state is hesitant to become involved in this style of warfare. Further, as discussed earlier, the current nation-state world configuration combined with growing interdependence and nuclear deterrence has created a situation where the probability of central war on a European front is highly unlikely. The costly nature of and the high stakes involved with this type of warfare encourages a hesitancy of national policy makers to commit troops to any conflict which may become protracted.⁴⁷ But where does the "Army Concept" fit into a worldwide containment or proinsurgency strategy? As stated earlier, it is designed to fight a central front style war in areas already made fairly safe from full scale conflict due to the earlier exemplified deployments. This then becomes the salient point of the issue, simply the fact that the U.S. currently has an army prepared to fight a highly unlikely war.

A. General Description.

⁴⁶General Sir John Hackett et al., The Third World War (New York, NY: Berkely Books, 1980).

⁴⁷Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review 82 (June 1988), 438-439.

Within the aforementioned "Army Concept", the U.S. Army has developed an organization which is very well suited for engaging in "Concept" style warfare. This organization, as an ideal type from which differing configurations and missions are supported, is fairly standardized throughout the U.S. Army to include the divisions which have been specifically designed to be deployed in an unconventional mode. Therefore, a brief overview of this organization is helpful to inform the reader of the nature of Army doctrine.

The Combat Arms of the U.S. Army are made up of the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, and Combat Engineer branches. It should be readily apparent that the Artillery and Engineer branches can accomplish their doctrine in any form of hostile area. They only need to be directed where to lend their support. Armor and Air Defense Artillery are particularly unsuited to unconventional conflict and insurgency in general. The nature of an insurgency does not lend itself to very active enemy air or tank movements and, further, tanks or mechanized infantry vehicles could not be used effectively in support of infantry counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the U.S. Infantry with the support of Aviation assets plays the largest combative role in most doctrine dealing with unconventional war.

U.S. Army Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units as currently organized have certain

capabilities that, when modified, would easily fill the void between the "Concept" and the unconventional battle. Combat Support branches in the U.S. Army consist of units that provide direct support to the fighting force in the nature of communication, rear area security, intelligence, or aviation support. Combat Support units are composed of the Engineer, Chemical, Intelligence, Military Police, and Signal Corps. Combat Service Support units provide support that is required of every unit in times of peace or war. Units of this nature consist of the Adjutant General, Chaplain, Finance, Judge Advocate, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps.⁴⁸ Further, in the Combat Support arena the Army has developed numerous functional areas which officers and enlisted soldiers are trained to enhance the combat capabilities of the commander. Two of these areas which could have significant roles in unconventional war are the areas of Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). These functional areas figure prominently in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and would continue to do so under any proposal developed to engage the unconventional conflict in a successful manner.

1. Organization to Fight - Current.

The largest maneuver element in the United States Army is the Army Corps, normally commanded by a Lieutenant

⁴⁸The Army Officer's Guide, 39th ed., (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1977), 465-513.

General and consists of three to five divisions of various compositions. Between the major air or railhead and the Corps Headquarters is the Theater Area Army Command (TAACOM) commanded by a General who is the supreme commander of all U.S. Army forces in the country or the area of conflict. Subordinate to the Corps is the Division. The Division is the primary cohesive fighting force of the U.S. Army. Soldiers assigned to the active component typically identify themselves with a division they are currently assigned to or have been assigned to in the past. Popularly famous units of recent history have not been corps but divisions which also seems to indicate a modern trend away from engaging the enemy in massively interlocked corps and army formations. Subordinate and organic to the Division is, in descending order, the Brigade, the Battalion, the Company or Battery, and the Platoon. The Platoon is normally made-up of thirty to forty men depending on the type unit. There is ideally three subordinate elements combined to establish the higher unit (e.g. three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, etc.). Additionally, each organization above the platoon level is assigned various specialized support soldiers to assist the commander in leading the unit. Therefore, the division's warfighting strength is the aggregate of a division headquarters element, three brigade headquarters elements, nine battalion headquarters elements, twenty-seven company headquarters elements and eighty-one

platoons consisting of thirty to forty men each.

In addition to the above organization, a division is assigned various support units typically consisting of a brigade sized Division Artillery (DIVARTY), a brigade sized Division Support Command (DISCOM) consisting of Medical, Maintenance, and Supply and Transport (S&T) Battalions, an Aviation Brigade or Battalion, an Engineer Battalion, an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion, a Signal Battalion, a Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, a Military Police (MP) Company, an Adjutant General (AG) Company, and a Finance Company and all the corresponding equipment, supplies, weaponry, and ammunition to go along for an aggregate of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers depending on the configuration and missions of the division.⁴⁹

Obviously, this is a massive organization requiring much to move and sustain it in the field. Every soldier in a division, no matter the grade, is concerned with either training to fight or fighting the current battle to a successful conclusion or supporting that mission. Very little time is spent in training for or concentrating on fighting the differing forms of unconventional warfare. The Infantry elements are either at the front fighting or in the rear in reserve for commitment to the battle. In fact,

⁴⁹United States Army Combined Arms Services Staff School, Organization of the Army in the Field, E709 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 59-75.

unconventional training in a divisional setting is considered low priority and consists of a brief familiarization, if it is given at all.

To fight the unconventional conflict, the Army has developed specialized units or Special Operations Forces (SOF) for application to the unconventional task. SOF units, as organized in the Army today, consist of:

The First Special Operations Command: Part of the United States' Unified Command for Special Operations Forces and maintains operational command of the four Special Forces Groups currently in the Army inventory. The forces listed below are either directly responsible to this organization or have been developed to support the mission of this organization.

Special Forces: Otherwise known as the "Green Beret". Specialize as mainly military trainers and advisors in friendly Third World countries. Their role since early Vietnam has evolved into an insurgency style force, similar to a Soviet "Spetsnaz" team concept, specializing in disruption and confusion behind the enemy lines in a conventional or "Concept" style scenario.

The Delta Force: Or more commonly, 1st Special Forces Group, Detachment Delta. Based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and specializing in counter-terrorist activity. Similar in concept to the British SAS and acts as a limited response force to worldwide terrorist activity which

negatively impact on U.S. security interests abroad.

The U.S. Army Rangers: Primarily a rapid reaction force for the conventional battlefield whose mission largely consists of conventional combat behind enemy lines.

Task Force 160: Simply a unification of specialized Army aviation assets to support the above units. Its scope and application is limited to supporting selected SOF units and the task force would be hard pressed to support the entire SOF organization during expanded unconventional operations.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Units: Units organized with the specialized task of utilizing the various forms of mass communications to win an unfriendly civilian population over to the side of U.S. or Allied forces. Primarily a support unit used prior to and directly after conventional hostilities. PSYOP's primary area of concern is usually behind the enemy lines.

Civil Affairs (CA) Units: The only organized unit whose primary concern is assisting the civil population behind the friendly lines. CA personnel are trained to advise and assist friendly military and civilian personnel in civic activities to include establishing and operating a new government for an occupied country. CA units are very concerned with improving the civilian perception of U.S.

Forces in country.⁵⁰

This is the configuration of U.S. Special Operations Forces today. The important thing to realize is that only one of the above organizations is primarily concerned with assisting a civilian population in affairs that would create a popular support for the missions and goals of the Army in a foreign area. Special Forces, as originally designed, have that capability, but as already mentioned, have evolved into a force more fitting the "Concept". The reasons for this are more psychological than real. An infantryman is trained from day one that his primary objective is to close with and destroy the enemy and to do this, hopefully, during offensive actions. This is the ideal, the "noble" form of war as taught by all the service schools. To dwell on any other form of battle, like counterinsurgency, is playing "dirty" and not conforming to the structure of war. War should be made up of two uniformed combatants slugging it out in a purely "Clausewitzian" fashion, not of an enemy who presents a friendly face by day and kills you at night.

Another psychological aspect of the conversion of SOF to the conventional "Concept" is that SOF units are primarily made up of infantry soldiers who have gone on to an elite and highly specialized form of warfighting.

⁵⁰Stephen D. Goose, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Warriors and Their Weapons," in Low Intensity Warfare Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 85-88.

Promotions to the higher ranks are dependent on a quick view of an assignment and specialty history (the Officer Record Brief - ORB) and a fast perusal of an officer's efficiency reports (OER) by a board of senior officers who have a certain ceiling to meet. A system such as this is obviously geared to outstanding performance in all jobs, but more importantly and what is usually a large discriminator, outstanding performance in outstanding jobs. It can easily be seen that a "Concept" oriented leadership will more readily promote individuals who have demonstrated excellence in "Concept" related occupations. Unconventional warfighting is not one of these jobs. Hence, an Army wide emphasis on training for and demonstrating proficiency in "Concept" style functions.

If, as demonstrated earlier, the most likely threats confronting the U.S. policymaker and professional soldier are unconventional threats and the prevalent form of doctrine is "Concept" driven, how can the U.S. Army be an effective force in the support of the security policy of the United States. One must look to U.S. security concerns to rectify this seeming discrepancy. Therefore, let us look into the nature U.S. national security policy and how we can bring the idea of the "Army Concept" into congruency with the unconventional mission.

B. Relation to U.S. National Security Interests.

The United States Army trains in accordance with "The

Concept" to enable it to fight and win the worst case scenario of a European Central Front war with the Soviet Union or possibly a similar type war in the deserts of the Middle East. This ability serves as the main tactical deterrent against the evolution of a purely conventional war against the United States and its allies. Further, it is viewed by the U.S. western allies as a specific deterrent against Soviet aggression in such areas as West Germany, Turkey, and South Korea. This deterrent is largely dependent on the U.S. ability to maintain competency in conventional Armor and Heavy Mechanized tactics and doctrine.

"The Concept" can also be applied to the areas of the Pacific rim, in Southeast Asia, and in Central America which depend heavily on the ability of the U.S. to deploy rapidly and engage in the conventional battle to act as a deterrent to Soviet or Cuban backed aggression. U.S. deployments in Third World countries are largely made-up of elements consisting of Straight Leg Infantry or Light Infantry Division (LID) units which train the conventional warfighting "Concept" in a smaller, less automated manner, as described in an article by Stephen D. Goose.⁵¹ No matter what the environment, terrain, or size of the force, U.S. primary adherence to what many have referred to as the

⁵¹Ibid, 98-99.

"Army Concept" is imperative to meet U.S. security goals in this century and the next. The U.S. Army remains convinced of this point. A look at the current training common to all U.S. Army Officers will quickly demonstrate this point.

Attendance to the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is mandatory for all active Army Officers in the grade of Captain upon successful completion of an intensive, yearlong correspondence course. Fort Leavenworth is also the home of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and represents the cutting edge of contemporary Army education in tactics and doctrine. CAS3 is designed to teach the officer who has reached a certain level of proficiency in his assigned branch (Infantry, Armor, Military Police, etc.) the basics and necessity of working as a successful member of a Combined Arms Team serving on a battalion, brigade, or General staff. Throughout the school, the organizational and planning processes used are taught within the "Army Concept" as it has been outlined. The final exercise, planning for the movement and simulating the fighting of a Mechanized Infantry Division in combat, consists of a simulated deployment to West Germany. Unconventional doctrine is never discussed.

Each Captain the U.S. Army is taught this "Concept". Many of these officers represent the future senior leadership of the U.S. Army. The importance of the "Army

Concept" is firmly entrenched, possibly to some detriment.⁵² Is "The Concept" effectively meeting the security goals of the United States? This question will be discussed in the next section.

C. Deficiencies in the Concept

As earlier described the "Concept" is a structured affair designed to either offensively take objectives or to perform flexible defensive operations against an enemy front. The idea of a circular defensive perimeter did not enter into U.S. tactical thought until the Vietnam War and then it was simply a modification of Ranger style tactics which were originally used behind enemy lines. Until the Vietnam War, tactical security consisted of simply linking up with the unit on the right and left and maintaining an element in reserve. The advent of terrorist or guerilla acts behind friendly lines in areas commonly considered relatively safe and occupied by reserve or support units created a need for a new security tactic. But the fight with established enemy units at the front called for a "Concept" style organization. Therefore, security of rear areas became a doctrine in the counterinsurgency war. This doctrine pulled troops from combat forces on the front, thereby severely hampering offensive operations. Combat

⁵²United States Army Combined Arms Services Staff School, Tactics Overview, E607, 3 vols. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Government Printing House, 1984), vol. 2, 35-59.

resources were being dedicated to places other than the primary point of the battle. The U.S. Infantry, upon attempting to fight a war such as the one in Vietnam, quickly grew frustrated in the lack of clear tactical objectives, the absence of a professional uniformed enemy, and their diversion to non-infantry style programs like pacification or counterinsurgency efforts. The infantry units assigned to this task were still of the mind set of search and destroy and consequently began attacking hamlets and villas known to be supporting the insurgent forces.

Eventually objective, economy of force, and unity of command (all of which are principles of war) were lost in fighting this style warfare. Lack of direction and effective control over the battle persisted. Hence the breakdown of the "Concept". This frustration rapidly developed into a disenchantment with the war and an undermining of discipline that, when fueled by the fires of popular dissension at home, led to the general belief that the war was unwinnable, the eventual redeployment of U.S. Forces, and a loss of the country to an autocratic communist regime. A dissonance such as this is likely to occur in any unconventional conflict the U.S. government attempts with uniformed troops. Does this mean that any U.S. military support to unconventional conflict as a form of intervention is doomed to failure from the start? This is not necessarily so, but significant doctrinal changes must occur

prior to an undertaking similar to Vietnam or active military support to any Central American state. One thing that is absolutely essential is that, in our next unconventional undertaking, the U.S. must prevail in order to maintain world credibility.

This is not to say that the "Concept" does not have a place in the management of unconventional war. Far from the point, the "Concept" plays the large role of disrupting non-locally produced and supplied resource lines of supply, engaging the support structure of the enemy, preventing the evolution of the battle into the counteroffensive phase of insurgent warfare, and it ensures the security of the borders and the sovereignty of the supported country. But it must be modified to accomplish the mission. This fact was reaffirmed as late as December 1982 when the former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer stated:

"Nevertheless, I believe that we have been myopic in structuring the force for a single scenario and not having forces capable of responding to threats throughout the world. I have long contended that we need to pay attention to the "other Army", the Army traditionally ready to respond to the full spectrum of threats against this nation and its friends anywhere, not just in the Fulda Gap."⁵³

IV. Developing the Force to Meet Projected Needs

A. Impact of Arms Control

⁵³Brian M. Jenkins, "Terrorism and Beyond," Report of an International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict, Santa Monica, CA, December 1982, 40-41.

Of late, popular support of a nuclear freeze or disarmament in both Europe and the United States has lead the U.S. to rethink nuclear strategy and has lead to negotiations resulting in the recent Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and the actual destruction and demilling of certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Further, the Soviet Union seems to be continually making overtures in an attempt to effect some new form of nuclear disarmament. Although this trend is a positive one, the total disarmament of the two superpowers is highly unlikely. Both powers must maintain a response to the growing number of less powerful nations who have acquired nuclear weaponry and there is always the concern that the total disarmament of the major superpowers would increase the likelihood of conventional war in Europe or the Middle East along the lines of World War II. Disarmament, in this sense, should be viewed as a destabilizer of the system.⁵⁴ Therefore, the maintenance of strategic nuclear arsenals is probably assured into the foreseeable future, however, at levels indicative of a concern for quality over quantity. Although this might be a disheartening thought, one should consider that it is probably better living in peace under the threat of nuclear

⁵⁴Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 3d ed. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 386.

war than living in an era when modern global conventional war would not only be possible but very likely. If a capable and effective nuclear arsenal is the cost for the maintenance of global peace, then a strong nuclear arsenal is necessary. The Bush Administration will probably continue a policy of a strong strategic nuclear defense with no unilateral disarmament action that could be viewed as a weakness by the Soviet Union. This will continue to foster the growing cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR and drive the likelihood of nuclear war down.

In a similar vein the demilling of chemical weapons to a point is viewed as a positive step toward stabilization of the current international scenario. However, the maintenance of a chemical deterrent must be included in the force structure of the U.S. Army to counter threats from known hostile Third World nations such as Libya and Iran. The optimal solution is the continued development and storage of binary chemical weapons to a certain level as agreed upon in a chemical weapon regime between either the U.S. and the USSR or NATO and the USSR combined with the maintenance of a well trained Chemical Corps within the U.S. Army. These forces will then augment the expansion of the conventional forces as described below such that the U.S. Army will be better prepared to engage and defeat whatever threat is presented in the next decade and beyond.

B. A Proposal

My proposal is a simple one, yet one that, if adopted, may have far reaching impact on the role and training of certain support branches of the U.S. Army. It would not radically change the "Concept" nor require large segments of the combat force to be retrained. As stated earlier, this proposal would successfully inter-mesh the "Army Concept" with the fighting of the unconventional war. The basis for this proposal began with an article written by Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr., U.S. Army Reserve. In his article General Bell advocates the development and activation of Civil Affairs units to deploy to areas of U.S. vital interests and establish the basic structure for augmentation by combat units if necessary, and further to begin unconventional operations upon the arrival of these combat units.⁵⁵ This seems to be a start in the right direction, but General Bell stops his support short of fighting the threat with the support units already in place;

"...if the level of insurgent activity in the country, or region, increases and U.S. combat elements must be introduced, the infrastructure to support them will already be in place."⁵⁶

The article commits the same mistake of assuming the commitment of U.S. combat forces to fight a threat which does not represent a "Concept" styled force. This action

⁵⁵BG Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "To Be IN CHARGE," Military Review (April 1988), 18-19.

⁵⁶Ibid, 21.

will undoubtedly result in the continuation of the Vietnam Syndrome, a military defeat in the country deployed, and a political defeat in the U.S. As an answer to this dilemma, this paper proposes the following organizational concept to provide a "Flexible Support Doctrine".

1. Organization to Fight - Future.

This paper advocates the full scale planning for deployment of U.S. forces under the "Army Concept" standard scenario upon a request for assistance by any government or supported political group which has become a victim of an unconventional threat and has determined that the stability and security of the regime is in question. As to whether to commit troops to such a situation or not is purely a political question, one that must be made at the policy maker's level. However, continuous consultation with the command structure of the U.S. Defense establishment must be initiated long before the decision to commit is made. An ongoing evaluation of the situation must be available from the unified U.S. Intelligence community concerning the nature of the conflict, the likelihood of conventional hostilities, and the dominant threat of unconventional conflict. Upon evaluation of the intelligence data, a command decision must be made as to the amount of necessary combat forces to be deployed to begin conventional operations and the amount of special (non-infantry) forces to be deployed to begin unconventional operations. These

units would be the typical support units assigned to a division, only augmented and specially trained to fight the differing aspects of unconventional war. This task force would operate inside the conventional boundaries in the towns, villages, and farm communities to support the population against the weapons of the non-concept style force.

Military Police assets would be devoted to assisting the local police and militia in training the local population to protect themselves, they would also provide necessary security in the cities and surrounding areas until local forces were self-sufficient. Civil Affairs units would assist the local government officials in modifying inefficient support or utility systems, Engineer units would be directed to assist the local government in necessary construction projects or in the creation of better living conditions in the villages or cities. Signal units could better establish or re-establish mass media systems under favorable control of the local government. PSYOP's units could help prepare information dissemination procedures, both within and outside of secured areas. Intelligence units could provide local governments with information concerning the movement and capabilities of insurgent and revolutionary forces in the country. Medical units could provide necessary medical and dental support to the population. And finally, the Chaplain Corps could be

utilized to provide religious assistance where catastrophe has struck.

The possibilities are almost limitless, however, the emphasis here is to develop a sense of trust and confidence in the local population concerning the commitment of the U.S. Government and in the locals themselves and their ability to overthrow the yoke of the type of threat that is currently engaging their stability.

Conceptually, one would view this organization as an expanded divisional structure where conventional artificial boundaries and control measures are laid on the contested area, but where specialized organizations, already existing within the divisional structure, are expanded to assist in fighting the unconventional battle in the various rear areas under contention. Once the threat is identified, any tactician will advise that the best trained soldiers for the mission should be employed to most ensure the successful completion of that mission. Therefore, infantry units should be utilized to close with and destroy and active uniformed force who fights within the "Concept" as it has been discussed, but the unconventional battle should be fought by a combined force of the branches of the Army which have been specifically trained for the most prevalent threat in a given time or place.

An important point is that all these specializations are in the normal composition of a U.S. Army Division or

Corps as presently constituted but in nowhere near the numbers required to accomplish the mission. Augmentation, expansion, and specialized training of the force structure of these units would be required prior to sending a unit into an unconventional scenario. But this could readily be accomplished by augmenting the standard divisional force structure with elements from existing Special Operations Forces. Augmentations from reserve and active components could immediately be accomplished and training could be incorporated and ongoing at the various branch schools. This doctrinology is based in the fact that you would not have to retrain a single soldier in his specialty. The specialized combat support and combat service support units would simply be doing the mission for which they were originally trained, only for a civilian and allied force as well as the supported U.S. force. The only specialized training required would be a familiarization with the culture and nature of conflict of the country being supported.

Typical U.S. support units to the division would have to remain in place for the successful operation of the division. But another mission of the division would be to accomplish the unconventional battle, utilizing organic noncombat units. Therefore, the expansion of the necessary support units could be implemented on a case-by-case basis as the threat dictates. This structure could also ensure

that U.S. provided military and humanitarian aid is going to the proper programs rather than filtered through a possibly corrupt government to line the pockets of the corresponding elites. The Army would not have to budget for the aid provided to the country but would simply act as the conduit from the U.S. Government to the beleaguered population.

2. Application of the Future Concept.

Modification of this structure is highly flexible. If the intelligence community perceived a particularly strong local medical support system or a well organized security system then augmented Medical or Military Police assets could simply be left out of the planning phase or left in an alert status to deploy as needed. Less combat soldiers could be deployed if the overt threat is primarily in the contention phase; but they could be quickly augmented if a counteroffensive operation was discovered. What must be accepted by the U.S. Army command elements is that the infantry fighting the "Army Concept" has limited usefulness in the unconventional war. A command attitude must be developed which places the necessary emphasis on the augmentation of forces involved in a containment, proxy, counterinsurgency, or drug interdiction style conflict utilizing the available units which already have the specialized training to fire the most powerful shot of the war. Simply that of humanity, security, and stability.

Two areas of immediate concern come to mind where

application of the "Flexible Support" concept would go far to support unconventional operations for the benefit of the state concerned as well as U.S. security interests. El Salvador is nation that is being victimized by a Vietnam style communist insurgency. Although military aid is forthcoming from Congress, it seems that El Salvador will continue to be a battleground for competing ideologies into the near future. This seems to be due to a combination of continuing poverty and inability of the Duarte government to initiate reform.⁵⁷ However, if the United States and El Salvador were to decide that the stability of the El Salvadorian government was in the best interest of the U.S. and required the intervention of U.S. unconventional troops to ensure, then the application of this concept could be implemented immediately by deploying a U.S. Division's organic Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, Military Police, Engineer, Intelligence, and Medical personnel to initiate internal counterinsurgency operations in affected areas. Further, economic and military aid could be funneled through the task force command structure such that the poverty and landlessness problems could be addressed early on. If escalation was perceived, then the combat arms forces of the tasked division could be quickly deployed to begin defensive

⁵⁷Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, "El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited," in Low Intensity Conflict Ed(s) Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 132-135.

and offensive operations as required.

The second scenario would encompass a request from the Colombian government for aid in suppressing and defeating the terror that has engulfed that country in the wake of its crackdown on cocaine trafficking. Again, the requisite security and support personnel would be deployed to assist the soldiers and law enforcement agencies of Columbia. The answer would not be attacking the drug cartel's organization with combat soldiers, but to augment the internal forces of the country to defeat and apprehend a disorganized group which is better funded and more efficiently armed. This action would necessarily correspond with action by the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the area to stop trafficking as it leaves the country. Further, U.S. security and intelligence assets could be used to advise and assist in the protection of the legal system of Columbia such that no reluctance by the elites of that state would hinder stopping the flow of this deadly drug to the United States.

These examples are only two of the many scenarios that exist where this concept could be effective. Further, a historic track record is available which would support this concept. Examples of such would be the courageous and effective Military Police counterattack during the 1968 TET offensive in Vietnam, Aviation support in fighting the counterinsurgent battle of Vietnam, and Engineer and Special Forces support to the civilian population during the early

years of Vietnam. All these activities were successful in accomplishing a small part of the unconventional war of the time, if these are aggregated into an organizing doctrine within the U.S. Army, we can better ensure the Army's success of future armed conflict.

V. Conclusion

Many popular authors as well as this paper have pointed to the low probability of a Central Front style or Strategic Nuclear War in the foreseeable future. This is largely a part of the increased positive relationship between the superpowers as well as the concern for the massive destructive ability of the nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, there seems to be a dearth of real recommendations as to how the doctrinologist should view these trends and convert them into doctrine that is designed to meet the nations security goals. The United States Army must modify concepts that cannot accomplish this mission while maintaining an effective worldwide conventional deterrent within limited economic constraints. To accomplish this, the Army must get the most out of its training dollar and not begin the retraining of divisions of infantry soldiers or lay the responsibility on a command which does not have the personnel or the support to ensure victory in a full scale unconventional conflict. It must simply utilize the training it has already accomplished within it's organic

support elements.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support units are trained in the art of war as well as their specialty mission and are better suited for establishing a significant relationship with the local population of a country which is caught in the throes of some form of unconventional warfare. Combat elements must be deployed to assist in the external security of the country and the system as a whole, but organic support elements could most effectively be used to engage and isolate the unconventional soldier. The future of armed conflict will necessarily revolve around unconventional modalities of warfare, however, it is imperative that the U.S. Army maintains an effective conventional deterrence. To accomplish both missions, the Army must develop a cost effective attitude and reconfigure to attack both threats with any unit in the collective force structure. It is not inconceivable that the U.S. could be faced with another world situation where two fronts are actively being fought, what the trainers must realize is that the odds are very good that at least one, and probably both, of those fronts will be involved in fighting of an unconventional nature. The force structure of the U.S. Army must be prepared to meet two or more ongoing unconventional threats while ensuring to the rest of the free world that our conventional deterrence is still active and valid. This can only be accomplished by a cost effective switch to a

"Flexible Support" posture that can respond to the various threats presented in the world today with the doctrine that can successfully accomplish the mission.

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